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Foreword 
German development policy defines itself as a major contributor to Germany’s interna-
tional effort to generate conditions that are conducive for economically, socially and ecol-
ogically sustainable development. This policy approach has been termed ‘Global Struc-
tural Policy’ (‘Globale Strukturpolitik’). Against this background, the German Develop-
ment Institute is currently carrying out a research project which aims to identify future op-
tions and strategies for international co-operation with some of the country’s important 
partners on development in the world. The group of countries are considered ‘anchor 
countries’ (or regional hubs) and include China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, 
amongst others. Anchor countries are political, economic and military heavyweights on a 
regional and – partly – global scale. As they increasingly engage in international fora, they 
will become even more important partners for industrialized countries to tackle global 
problems and to shape global structural policy. 
In the course of the research project, a series of country studies has been commissioned in 
order to provide solid knowledge on the relevant structures and medium to long-term pol-
icy trends within these countries and on the role of these countries in different fora of 
global structural policy. This report constitutes the South African component of the pro-
ject. Based on these background studies, researchers of the German Development Institute 
have undertaken portfolio-analyses of current relations between Germany and the respec-
tive anchor countries in order to guide the transformation of the relationships into strategic 
partnerships. 
Further material regarding the anchor country research project can be accessed on the 
website of the German Development Institute. The project is funded by the Federal Minis-
try of Economic Development and Cooperation (BMZ). 
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1 Introduction 
In the immediate post-Apartheid period many commentators gave the country, and the 
newly elected African National Congress (ANC) government, short shrift. Whilst there 
was a predominant air of hope an underlying “Afro-pessimism” was prevalent. Now, after 
more than 10 years of sustained – albeit fairly sedentary – economic expansion and a re-
cent acceleration in the growth trajectory opinions are being revised. This re-evaluation is 
naturally supported by the government. But significant domestic problems remain. These 
problems play out in South Africa’s approach to global economic and political relations, 
and underpin the analysis in this report. How might these dynamics play out in specific 
“global structural domains” in the future? 
This report is structured as follows: Part two considers South Africa in the global and Af-
rican contexts. It begins by reviewing South Africa’s integration into and prospects in the 
global economy. Then it considers the domestic socio-economic dynamics within which 
economic and social policy is formulated and charts the broad contours of economic pol-
icy since 1994. It then considers South Africa’s environmental challenges and policy re-
sponses as a distinct set of challenges. It ends with a brief assessment of the country’s do-
mestic political institutions in light of the policy challenges outlined in the previous sec-
tions. 
Part three considers the South African government’s views on and stances towards key 
global governance issues. It begins with a substantive overview of the country’s evolving 
foreign policy in general, then considers a number of different issues in the global govern-
ance terrain. It then focuses specifically on global trade governance via the World Trade 
Organization, and situates this within a discussion of South Africa’s broader trade strategy 
encompassing regional dynamics and bilateral negotiations. 
Part four briefly outlines the contours of German-South African relations and highlights 
some challenges in the relationship moving forward. 
Part five identifies key risk factors facing the South African government and, via a simple 
scenario exercise indicates possible avenues for deployment of German development as-
sistance in order to assist the South African government to address those challenges. 
2 South Africa in the Global and African Contexts 
2.1 Integration Into and Prospects in the Global Economy 
The South African economy is medium-sized by global standards, albeit a giant in the Af-
rican context. In constant 2000 US dollars, South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
and GDP per capita in 2003 were about 139 billion and 3000, respectively (see Figure 1). 
The next largest African economy is Egypt, whose GDP and per capita income in 2003 
were, respectively, almost 30 billion and 1500 dollars less than South Africa’s. Further 
underlining South Africa’s pre-eminence in Africa is the fact that in 2003 it accounted for 
about 38 % of total sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP, but only 6 % of its estimated 700 million 
people. 
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It is difficult to find a ready comparator country anywhere in the world, as most of the 
economies of similar size to South Africa’s tend to have very different per capita income 
levels (viz. Malaysia or Chile, who are smaller but richer, or Indonesia, which is larger but 
much poorer). Only Thailand and perhaps Turkey could be genuinely regarded as being 
similar in size and income, although neither suffers inequality on the scale witnessed in 
South Africa (see Figure 2). 
South Africa’s openness to trade in goods and services is about average for developing 
countries of its size, currently hovering around 60 percent of GDP. By this measure South 
Africa has many neighbours, including Germany, Chile, China, Indonesia and South Ko-
rea. The USA, India and Argentina trade much less of their domestic output, while Thai-
land and the Czech Republic trade much more. The latter two in fact posted trade to GDP 
ratios in the 120 %-130 % percent range in 2003. 
The composition of South Africa’s trade has changed dramatically over the years. Gold’s 
dominance during the 1970s is clearly visible in Figure 3 below, but so is its equally dra-
matic decline. Yet strategic minerals remain an important source of export earnings. These 
include, amongst others, gold, diamonds, platinum group metals, silver, copper, iron ore, 
coal, and uranium. The platinum group has taken over from gold as the single largest min-
eral export, but will never be as important to total exports as gold was in its heyday. 
Figure 1: Comparative GDP and GDP per capita data, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2004 
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Figure 2: Total trade in goods and services to GDP, 1994-2003 (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2004 
Figure 3: South African export trends, 1970-2002 (real 1995 Rands) 
 
 
Source: Trade and Industrial Policy Secretariat, online data available at www.tips.org.za 
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Commercial agriculture is well-established, although climatic conditions do not favour an 
expansion of this sector (only one fifth of South Africa’s land mass is arable). Rather, ex-
port gains are most likely to come from productivity increases and diversification into 
higher value-added crops. Consequently, an emerging public debate over the environ-
mental and consumer impacts of genetically modified (GM) crops and foods is gathering 
pace as more cropland is turned over to GM production. Furthermore, it is likely that some 
of the land currently available for commercial agricultural production will be reallocated 
(possibly through expropriation) to small-scale black farmers as part of the ongoing land 
reform process. This stratum of producers will need increasing amounts of state support 
(including land) to retain viable production. Whilst socially indispensable this process 
constrains prospects for expanding commercial agriculture. 
Manufactured exports have risen in relative importance over the decades (over 60 % of 
total exports in 2002), but three points should be borne in mind. The first is that primary 
product exports, driven by gold’s decline, have grown very slowly or not at all since the 
1980s. The rising share of manufactures in total exports therefore has as much to do with 
poor primary product export growth as it does with good manufactured export growth. 
Second, many product groups classified as manufactures are beneficiated natural re-
sources, including processed ores (iron, steel, aluminium), basic chemicals, rubbers and 
plastics, foodstuffs, and wood products. This, coupled with the more than 30 % of exports 
still attributable to mining, should leave one in no doubt that South Africa remains a heav-
ily resource-reliant exporting economy. Third, it is generally anticipated that sustained ex-
pansion of the US economy, coupled with China’s economic boom (and India coming on 
stream) will underpin commodity prices into the foreseeable future so the dominance of 
commodities and commodity-based products in our export basket is likely to continue. 
Revived growth in the German economy, and the European Union more broadly, would 
strengthen this trend, as would the inevitable appreciation of the Rand. 
Historically South Africa has depended on foreign capital inflows, especially from the 
United Kingdom, to fuel key sectors of the economy including mining and manufacturing. 
The domestic market is too small to sustain an inward-industrialization strategy, a process 
that in any event reached its limits in the 1970s. If improvements in competitiveness are to 
be realised, production for global markets is necessary. And for that South Africa needs 
foreign investment on a much larger scale than was the case during the crisis period of the 
1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. Inflows of foreign direct investment were very low during 
these times, but have risen relatively rapidly since 1994 (see Figure 4). Net Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) inflows now consistently contribute positively to fixed capital formation 
in South Africa, averaging 9 % since 1994. However if the clear outlier in 2001 (inflows 
associated with De Beers’ Restructuring) is removed, the average drops to 5.2 %. 
Thus the turnaround in foreign direct investment is still clearly in its infancy. Net inflows 
have averaged well under US $ 2 billion since 1994. Volatility is also uncomfortably high. 
Both of these post-1994 features are to some extent attributable to the large increases in 
outward fixed investment by South African firms, partly into other African countries. This 
development is clearly welcomed by both investors and recipients. But if South Africa’s 
industrial capacity is to expand and become more efficient, greater inward FDI remains a 
necessity. 
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Services contribute the most to South Africa’s GDP (the tertiary sector accounted for 62 % 
of real output on average between 2002 and 2004 – see Table 1) and employment. How-
ever, this share has not greatly increased in recent years, whilst the aggregate figure masks 
great variations in the composition of the sector. Services range from highly sophisticated, 
first world inputs in the financial and professional sectors, through government services, 
to tourism and survivalist retail activities. This reflects the dualistic nature of South Af-
rica’s economy, a pattern more broadly reflected in the labour market. 
Hence growth in services exports represents an area that must be considered a top priority 
for both the near- and long-term future. Not least because it is becoming increasingly ap-
parent that the emergence of low-cost labour surplus countries in Asia is rapidly curtailing 
policy options centred on a manufacturing-led growth strategy. It is almost trite to say that 
the services economy will most likely expand into the foreseeable future; the question is 
along which axes? Tourism and so-called “infrastructure services” (telecommunications; 
energy; transport; finance; and construction) will benefit from accelerating economic 
growth and continuation of South African corporate global expansion – notably into Af-
rica. These services will be supported by a competitive clustering of professional services 
in various fields (engineering; legal; architectural and so on), subject to growing skills 
shortages. If South Africa’s serious unemployment crisis is not addressed it is likely that 
the informal survivalist services sector will grow too. 
Figure 4: FDI indicators, 1970-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005. Note: GFCF = “gross fixed capital forma-
tion” 
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Manufacturing industry is arguably mature, with its contribution to GDP having been rela-
tively static for some decades now. The sector is also relatively capital-intensive,1 al-
though the productivity of capital is relatively low.2 Furthermore, the labour-intensive 
components of it have been hit hard by Asian, especially Chinese, competition in recent 
years. Growth areas are largely confined to capital-intensive sub-sectors, especially the 
automotive and chemicals industries, with downstream sub-sectors struggling to gain trac-
tion. Partly this is because of high input costs generated by monopoly or oligopoly firms 
dominating supply of these inputs (iron and steel; chemicals and associated plastics; tele-
communications) and partly because of a combination of poor management practices, lack 
of relevant skills, and restrictive labour legislation (especially centralised bargaining). A 
substantial contributor to these problems in recent years has been the strong currency gen-
erating import competition. However, the strong currency has also enabled capital retool-
ing thus laying platforms for future expansion. 
From the aforegoing it is clear that the South African economy remains resource-
dominated with a mature industrial sector and overall not much restructuring between the 
major sectors. Rather, sources of economic change are to be found within the major sec-
tors. Again this is a sign of economic maturity – a major problem in a country with very 
high structural unemployment. Furthermore, the majority of exports are still in some form 
or other dependent on the country’s natural resources (minerals in particular); whilst ‘pu-
                                                 
1 See Nattrass (2004). 
2 See Nattrass (2004, 146). 
Table 1: South African real output structure (% shares) 
 Ave 94-96 Ave 02-04 
Primary 10.63 5.77
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 2.09 1.62
Mining and quarrying 8.54 4.16
Secondary 30.62 32.58
Manufacturing 22.20 24.83
Electricity, gas and water 1.56 1.56
Construction 6.86 6.19
Tertiary 58.76 61.65
Trade (retail, catering, accommodation) 14.01 14.21
Transport, storage and communication 5.29 7.31
Financial, real estate and business services 11.38 11.37
Community and personal services 28.08 28.76
General government 21.37 19.96
Other services 6.71 8.80
Total GDP (2000 rands billions) 750,746 950,237
Source: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin 
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re’ manufacturing has not decisively escaped its three decades-long decline since the 
1970s. It is notable that manufacturing experienced sedentary growth in the 1990s, largely 
owing to investment stagnation. In addition, import penetration ratios have risen virtually 
across the board. This is popularly associated with rising unemployment. The real ques-
tion, and one which is constantly being debated, is whether a dynamic source of growth 
can be found that will pull the economy and employment along with it. The shifting con-
tours of that debate are sketched below. 
A Snapshot of Economic Policy Reforms Since 1994 
South Africa’s current commitment to an open, globally integrated economy is barely ten 
years old. During the Apartheid years (and before), trade was never seriously considered a 
means of growth and employment creation. As such, South Africa’s trade and industrial 
policy-making histories are largely characterised by protectionism and import-substitution. 
Economic policy thinking began to change during the 1980s, largely in response to the 
increasing isolation of the Apartheid government in the previous two decades. But the 
sanctions period (1985-1993) effectively halted the beginnings of a liberalization process 
– and South African firms’ access to global production networks was greatly curtailed. 
This real economy approach was underpinned by a broadly accommodative monetary pol-
icy stance, particularly in the 1970s and early 1980s, but was replaced by a strict monetary 
policy in the wake of the 1984/5 debt crisis and associated need to attract foreign portfolio 
capital in order to acquire foreign exchange to service the debt. Increasing security expen-
ditures in the 1980s and early 1990s as moves towards a political settlement gathered pace 
ensured that the ANC government inherited a depleted fiscus. 
South Africa’s reintegration into the global economy since 1994 can be broadly character-
ized according to three (largely macroeconomic) phases: “growth through redistribution” 
(1994-1995); “Economic orthodoxy” (1996-2001); and “Keynesian kick-start” (2002-
present).3 Each policy phase was preceded by and accompanied with particular political 
and economic developments. 
“Growth through Redistribution” essentially reflected the (temporary) ascendancy in the 
South African polity of internal anti-apartheid forces allied with the dominant trade union 
movement, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). COSATU formed 
the so-called “tri-partite alliance” with the ANC and South African Communist Party 
(SACP). The core of this strategy, the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP), was to bridge the divide between the poor (black), marginalised majority and the 
rich, urbanised (white) minority through infrastructure investment and redistribution via 
the tax system. This was accompanied by widespread labour market reforms designed to 
extend greater protection to workers whilst legislating preferential hiring policies for 
blacks through employment equity. In essence this was a Keynesian expenditure strategy 
accompanied by reorganization (tightening) of the labour-market. 
“Economic orthodoxy” arose in response to a serious currency crisis in early 1996 associ-
ated with the appointment of South Africa’s first black finance minister who was be-
queathed a legacy of excessive state expenditure by the previous government. Its adoption 
                                                 
3 See Hirsch (2005) for a succinct overview and analysis of current dynamics. 
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was also influenced by the failure of the RDP to deliver on its promises in light of the new 
government’s difficulties in managing and controlling the apparatus of the state. The RDP 
was basically abandoned in favour of fiscal rectitude, although labour market reforms 
were retained.4 The key pillar was a macroeconomic stabilisation strategy designed to ap-
pease global financial markets in a context where South Africa’s capital markets were in-
creasingly integrated into global financial markets. This reorientation of economic policy 
was led by the then Deputy President, and current President, and is at the heart of current 
tensions with the ANC and its alliance partners regarding the Presidential succession set to 
take place in 2009. 
At that time the “Washington consensus” was the dominant ideological framework gov-
erning “the markets’” approach to developing country economic policy and South Africa’s 
hastily unveiled macroeconomic strategy: Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR), was designed to appease those markets for fear of being punished to the point of 
“mortgaging the country’s future”.5 This consisted of tight controls over state expenditure 
and the introduction of inflation targeting. The appropriateness of this stance was rein-
forced during the currency crisis of 1998 which South Africa, in contrast to other emerg-
ing markets in Asia and Latin America, managed to weather relatively well through appli-
cation of orthodox interest rate policy. Throughout this period relatively stringent capital 
account controls were retained.  Accompanying this shift in macroeconomic policy was a 
trade liberalization episode characterized by implementation of South Africa’s Uruguay 
Round commitments under the newly formed World Trade Organisation (WTO) see be-
low) and conclusion of bilateral free trade agreements with the European Union and the 
countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
The economic impact of tariff liberalization is very difficult to measure precisely, partly 
owing to data limitations, but also the difficulty of separating tariff reduction effects from 
the impact of other policy changes. What is clear is that the economy underwent structural 
shifts in the 1990s. Reliance on exports of natural resources waned slightly and services 
became steadily more important. Furthermore, growth of non-primary goods exports (real 
manufactured export growth averaged 5 % between 1995 and 2002) has improved South 
Africa’s external position. 
Yet South Africa’s tariff structure remains needlessly complex and inefficient. The num-
ber of mixed-duty tariff lines stood at 1701 in 2002, there were still 38 different ad 
valorem tariff rates (32 more than in South Africa’s Formal Offer to the WTO), and if 
non-ad valorem rates are included, the number equalled 217 in 2002. Wherever the debate 
over trade liberalization goes, there can be no doubt that in the meantime a further simpli-
fication and rationalization of the existing protective architecture (itself a form of liberali-
zation) is both a desirable and achievable policy goal. 
Equally clearly, however, is that any attempts to explicitly liberalize further would have to 
be sensitively managed. The current leadership crisis in the ANC is exposing serious divi-
sions over the direction economic policy ought to take in the future. And this in spite of 
the fact that the economy is showing signs of a sustained upturn. Crucially, job creation is 
                                                 
4 Thus from the orthodox economist’s standpoint two major policy reforms were directly contradictory: 
liberalization of trade and capital markets versus tightening labour markets. 
5 Hirsch (2005). 
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still slow and unemployment rates high, rendering arguments for trade liberalization vul-
nerable to attack from those hostile to it. The stakes are therefore high. 
The “Keynesian kick-start” period arose partly out of a new-found confidence generated 
by a couple of years of macroeconomic stability arising from the orthodox period, but 
more importantly in response to South Africa’s pressing social problems.  In a sense it 
represents a return to the “Growth through Redistribution” period but with the crucial dif-
ference that the current custodians of economic policy are actively advocating labour-
market reforms.6 It was given intellectual support through Joseph Stiglitz’s trenchant cri-
tique of economic orthodoxy;7 and the “Third Way” paradigm. It has also been accompa-
nied by greater emphasis on redistribution via “broad-based black economic empower-
ment” designed to give blacks a greater stake in the economy via an accelerated affirma-
tive action programme. 
Essentially this phase has been characterised by a stated desire to loosen the fiscal policy 
taps through selective welfare expenditures and investment in public infrastructure 
through state-owned corporations. As such it is a combination of demand stimulus and 
supply-side economics. The latter is intended to shift the economic growth path to annual 
rates of 6 percent of GDP by 2014 – a target some commentators regard as feasible. How-
ever, complications have arisen around a lack of capacity to spend – both at the local level 
in respect of welfare payments and service delivery; and at central level in state-owned 
enterprises. This lack of capacity is linked to a sustained and deepening skills shortage in 
the upper echelons of the economy, a fact not helped by the government’s obstructive 
stance on immigration of skilled workers into the country.8 In addition there has until re-
cently been an unwillingness in government institutions, especially at local government 
level, to retain skilled officials and managers, in the name of racial equity. 
A potentially more binding constraint is the currency. Between 1994 and 2002 the cur-
rency generally depreciated thereby boosting exports whilst contributing to inflation. In 
the wake of the September 11th attacks on the United States South Africa experienced a 
third currency shock (depreciation) and associated inflationary response. This curtailed the 
onset of the Keynesian kick-start period, which began to get underway in earnest only in 
the last two years. This owed much to the strength of the currency – in turn owing to 
buoyant commodity prices – and consequent curtailment of inflation. With inflation now 
firmly under control, albeit with previous episodes firmly embedded in the domestic cost 
structure, the stage is now set for fiscal expansion. 
Yet wild currency swings are now regarded as the single largest impediment to invest-
ment, both domestic and foreign. Furthermore, with commodity prices seemingly set to 
continue their strength for the foreseeable future there are substantial concerns that South 
Africa is experiencing “Dutch disease”9 and that this will continue. Hence there is alarm in 
                                                 
6 See O’Grady (2005). In the article, Tito Mboweni rues ‘unintended consequences’ of his labour law. Mr 
Mboweni is the current governor of the central bank and previous labour minister responsible for most 
of the key labour market reforms in the 1990s. 
7 See Stiglitz (2002). 
8 See Verwey (2005). 
9 Whereby the exchange rate appreciates owing to sustained revenue inflows arising from increased ex-
port receipts from commodity exports. The effect is allegedly to suppress the manufacturing sector. 
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certain quarters rooted in fears of “deindustrialization”,10 notably amongst groups commit-
ted to an active industrial strategy designed to boost labour-intensive industries. In this 
view a strong industrial policy combined with a looser macroeconomic policy and com-
petitive currency is required to address the unemployment crisis. 
The legacy of almost a century of inward orientation constitutes a significant challenge to 
the new ANC-led regime. Entrenched interests, gross inefficiencies, and underdeveloped 
bureaucratic capacities are increasingly exposed as market-driven adjustment pressures 
begin to tell. In this context an activist industrial policy seems unlikely to succeed, not-
withstanding its putative merits. And the broader social context, characterised by high un-
employment and poverty ensures a highly politicised debate concerning trade liberaliza-
tion. 
2.2 Socio-economic trends 
South Africa is still a racially polarised society – how could it be otherwise given our his-
tory? This is reflected in daily headlines in various forms, from controversy over reform-
ing the judiciary through black economic empowerment codes to land reform. It is the 
dominant fault-line in South African society. This reality is unlikely to alter in its essential 
aspect given that poverty, landlessness, lack of access to basic services, and unemploy-
ment are concentrated in the black (African) section of the population. 
The black population is subject to two sharply contradictory demographic trends: rapid 
population increase in the youth cohort which finds educational and employment opportu-
nities sharply circumscribed; and rapidly escalating deaths from HIV/AIDS. A brutal im-
plication of the latter trend is that the unemployment problem will be ameliorated in the 
medium to long term through potential population decline, but the reality is that AIDS 
deaths primarily affect the economically active population thereby contributing to skills 
shortages. This is reflected in the growing problem of orphanage, itself contributing to ris-
ing social instability. 
The minority populations (white, mixed race or “coloured”, and Asian) are relatively af-
fluent, urbanised and privileged in comparison. Of these three groups the coloured popula-
tion, traditionally concentrated in the Western Cape Province, suffers most from the rav-
ages of chronic unemployment and associated criminality. The Asian population, concen-
trated in KwaZulu-Natal Province, also has a large underclass but seems to have avoided a 
descent into the kind of systematic criminality and gang violence found in the Western 
Cape. Historically the white population has been and remains the most affluent group and 
consequently redress measures designed to benefit the black population largely target 
white privilege. 
To some extent these socio-economic dynamics are reflected in the President’s notion of 
“two economies”,11 although this depiction is only a partial reflection of South African 
                                                 
10 See Engineering News Online (2005). 
11 The first economy being globalised, largely white and suburban; the second economy being marginal-
ised from the formal economy, black (including coloured and Asian), and combining both the rural and 
urban underclasses. 
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socio-economic dynamics.12 This notion is grounded in development theory traditions, and 
is associated with the writings of Nobel Prize winner W. Arthur Lewis. 
It is obvious that income distribution in South Africa is highly unequal and skewed along 
racial lines. Traditionally South Africa vies with Brazil to claim top spot in the global Gini 
coefficient rankings (see Figure 5). The United States is close to the figure for the world as 
a whole, while countries such as Germany and the Czech Republic enjoy much more equi-
table income distributions. South Africa’s problems are further complicated by uneven 
geographic dispersions of inequality within the country. Yet since 1994, and even though 
per capita GDP has remained stagnant, affluence amongst the black population has in-
creased13 largely owing to policy measures favouring the black population and associated 
opening up of new economic opportunities for them. To some extent this underpins the 
current consumption led economic growth taking place. 
However, this is rooted in a context of chronic and escalating unemployment, which is 
now a significant driver of inequality across and within racial groups (whites included). 
Household poverty has also risen since 1994, although by how much is a matter of intense 
                                                 
12 For a sceptical account see Devey et al. (2005). 
13 See Development Policy Research Unit (2005). 
Figure 5: Gini coefficients, various countries and years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005. Note: Numbers in brackets indicate the lat-
est available years for each country. 
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debate.14 And there are growing concerns over implementation costs associated with an 
increasingly complex array of measures to boost black economic empowerment. Some 
black commentators have also voiced concerns that empowerment and affirmative action 
policies are undermining long-term incentives for black people to engage in entrepreneu-
rial and productive activities, thus giving rise to a new and potentially corrupt rentier class. 
Government argues, correctly, that rising and better targeted social welfare expenditures 
have significantly alleviated poverty, and that successful containment of inflation has 
benefited the poor, but this doesn’t alter the basic fact that approximately one in three job 
applicants is unable to find work in the formal sector. Consequently crime levels, although 
stabilising in recent years, rose steadily through the 1990s and into the early part of this 
millennium. These problems are unlikely to be alleviated by Government’s land reform 
programme either as it is fraught with problems associated with government’s capacity to 
implement the programme and supply supporting services. Given the Zimbabwe problem 
next door this is a serious medium-term problem for government leading to a stronger em-
phasis now on expropriation in order to fast-track reform.15 
The problem of government incapacity is chronic in many small towns across the country 
leading recently to a spate of violent protests against local councillors. For some local 
politicians holding office has become a career and an opportunity for personal enrichment, 
which takes priority over service-delivery to the community from whom they have 
emerged. Bad service delivery is compounded by the increasing disparity between the in-
come of the politicians and their constituents. By its own admission the ANC government 
is hard-pressed to control these problems given that the party is not in control of nomina-
tions for local government elections.16 
The local government elections on 1 March 2006 nevertheless delivered an overwhelming 
majority to the ANC, with the exception of the city of Cape Town, where specific circum-
stances prevail. The outcome points to the fact that even though the electorate were in dis-
satisfied with service delivery, they were unable to discern any other political party that 
they would vote for. By abstaining from casting their votes in protest, they enabled the 
ANC to retain seats with as little as thirteen votes cast. The case of Cape Town has subse-
quently illustrated the unwillingness of the ANC to hand over power to another party or 
coalition, even when its support in that local authority was lower than the opposing major 
coalition partner. It has used various means in its attempts to have the governing coalition-
elected mayor unseated, unsuccessfully to date. 
                                                 
14 Government argues that, statistically, much of this is associated with a “fracturing of households” as 
revealed in household censuses. By this they mean that the average recorded size of households has de-
creased at the same time as the number of households has risen. This is associated with rapid increases 
in rural-urban migration and workforce growth outstripping the capacity of the economy to create jobs. 
See Policy Coordination and Advisory Services “Overview” in Human Sciences Research Council 
(2004, 56). 
15 See Hofstatter (2005a) for an interesting analysis of these problems. He documents the failure of one of 
government’s flagship restitution projects. Essentially previously productive farmland was restored to its 
historical owners and, according to Hofstatter, government failures ensured the new owners were unable 
to recapitalise the farms and work them productively thus leaving them to fall into disuse. A growing 
fear is that as government turns towards forced expropriations this pattern will repeat and have serious 
economic consequences. These fears are probably exaggerated but the possibility remains. 
16 See Paton (2005). 
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This is compounded by slow delivery of housing for the urban poor by national govern-
ment. Yet the politics of housing delivery are increasingly fraught as provinces and mu-
nicipalities seek more control notwithstanding an obvious and widespread lack of capacity 
to deliver.17 Matters are scarcely better at provincial level where many provinces struggle 
with integrative planning functions. Altogether it seems that problems associated with 
government’s incapacity to deliver are brewing across a range of fronts. To a significant 
extent this reveals a broader problem of institutional ferment associated with the political 
transition, and accelerated “transformation”18 of all institutions. The Presidency is aware 
of these problems as reflected in the following statement: “…State institutions are still un-
dergoing significant growing pains and face the danger of a permanent and debilitating 
state of flux”.19 This may lead to more forceful interventions by national government into 
dysfunctional provincial and local government structures in the future. 
If the economy was growing robustly and unemployed workers and new job entrants were 
being rapidly absorbed, the racial underpinnings of the broader social dynamic and service 
delivery deficits would not necessarily be problematic. However, whilst the economy is 
showing signs of sustained and accelerated growth this happy scenario does not currently 
obtain.20 Consequently, contestation over all aspects of government policy is sharp and 
polarised. This is a potent cocktail into which the ANC’s current leadership succession 
battle has now been added. The succession debate has consequently highlighted deep divi-
sions within the tripartite alliance over the future course of economic policy. 
Much of this contestation revolves around catering for the poor and unemployed. We out-
lined the broad thrust of government’s response above, namely the shift to Keynesian de-
mand expansion and upgrading the economy’s supply-side. Within government (espe-
cially the Treasury) there are concerns about how far this strategy can be pushed without 
compromising the revenue base. Yet it has signed up to a reportedly massive expansion of 
public works expenditures, primarily on infrastructure, whilst also substantially increasing 
social welfare expenditures. On the other hand a significant constituency in the ANC now 
argues for reforms to promote labour market flexibility targeted at absorbing the huge pool 
of unskilled unemployed labour. Recognising that this probably isn’t feasible in the short-
term given the substantial tensions it would generate within the tripartite alliance, the gov-
ernment is now emphasising raising its own investment rate through significantly in-
creased expenditures. The flip side of this is that the rate of increase of social expenditures 
is to be capped in favour of state-led investment expansion.21 This has angered proponents 
of a policy initiative dubbed the Basic Income Grant (BIG). Advocates of this approach 
argue that government needs to significantly expand domestic expenditure on the basis of 
                                                 
17 See Radebe (2005). 
18 The precise meaning of this term is contested, but for our purposes essentially denotes promotion of 
non-whites into skilled occupations in both business and government in order to increase representivity 
of the majority population groups. Given the persistent skills shortage in the economy there is a signifi-
cant premium on non-white skilled employees thus generating rapid job mobility. This dynamic under-
mines job retention and associated build-up of the institutional memory so critical to ensuring govern-
ment delivery of services. 
19 See Human Sciences Research Council (2004, 52). 
20 Whilst the growth rate has trended up to around 4 percent of GDP, it is widely recognised that this needs 
to be increased to at least 6 percent and be sustained for at least a decade to make meaningful inroads 
into unemployment and poverty. 
21 See Robinson / Dawes (2005). 
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a grant extended to all citizens which would meet the twin objectives of alleviating pov-
erty whilst boosting domestic consumption. Treasury has ruled it out owing to concerns 
over how it would be funded. 
2.3 Environment Policies 
Climate change, the Kyoto protocol in particular, is increasingly discussed in South Af-
rica. This is underpinned by a number of imperatives associated with perceived impacts of 
global warming. There is a growing realisation that South Africa stands to lose considera-
bly through: desertification encroaching from the north and west; reduced river flows es-
pecially in the west; associated reduction in arable acreage; and re-emergence of debilitat-
ing diseases such as malaria that have hitherto been contained. Compounding this is the 
fact that we are already a water-constrained country, in a water-constrained region: ac-
cording to the Department of Water Affairs demand will exceed available water supplies 
in South Africa by 2025.22 
Clearly these trends hold serious implications for the future of agricultural production; a 
situation compounded by uncertainties around the land reform process, as discussed above 
(although government would not necessarily acknowledge this linkage). And we make our 
own substantial contribution to global warming and atmospheric pollution through our re-
liance on coal-fired energy, based on our huge coal endowment. This situation is likely to 
worsen over the next decade or so as government embarks on a massive energy infrastruc-
ture investment drive in accordance with the overarching goal to drive the economic 
growth rate up to 6 percent of GDP per annum, through lowering the cost of key inputs to 
industry, as outlined above. 
So what policy responses to these growing problems are discernible? First, substantial ef-
fort is being expended on experimentation with genetically-modified foods and crops. 
This is fraught with dangers, not least of which are the implications for our export profile 
should we pass a critical threshold the EU (our major agricultural export market) may find 
unacceptable.  Consequently, the government finds itself in an increasingly uncomfortable 
location in multilateral negotiations over the Cartagena (or biosafety) protocol. Arrayed 
against it is a collection of African countries arguing for tight controls over export and la-
belling of Living Modified Organisms (LMOs), in loose association with the EU which 
also seeks tighter controls in order to mollify domestic consumers. Whilst the major GM 
foods exporters (primarily the US, Brazil, Australia and China) have stayed out of the pro-
tocol South Africa signed up to it after 1994. Arguably, from a national interest perspec-
tive this was not a very far-sighted act but nonetheless the government finds its hands tied 
as it is obliged to negotiate controls over exports of GM foods which we increasingly pro-
duce. 
Secondly, the country is gearing up for more active participation in the Kyoto protocol, 
and a number of carbon-trading projects have been identified. There are some innovative 
projects on the table, for example a biomass conversion facility in Durban which should 
have positive environmental spin-offs. Sticking with this example biomass currently ac-
                                                 
22 Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (2004). 
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counts for about 8 percent of energy generation, and with oil prices seemingly set to con-
tinue their inexorable rise considerable attention is being given to the possibility of utlis-
ing our substantial maize surplus and sugar production to develop biomass fuel alterna-
tives. 
This points to the third response, namely diversification away from reliance on coal (and 
oil) based energy. This primarily takes two forms: nuclear and gas. Concerning the former, 
South Africa currently has only one functioning nuclear power station, situated in Cape 
Town because of the distance from the coal-fired power stations in the north-east of the 
country and the problems arising from power transmission over distances exceeding 1000 
km. The recent growth of the South African economy and the increased demand for elec-
tricity has stretched the ability of existing power stations to supply power near to their ab-
solute limits. In addition maintenance problems at the nuclear station and accompanying 
extended power supply disruptions has emphasized the vulnerability of Cape Town in par-
ticular to lack of generating capacity. The existence of this now aging station within full 
view of the city of Cape Town has added impetus to an active anti-nuclear campaign in 
that city. No comparable anti-nuclear sentiment is discernible in other parts of South Af-
rica. 
Government has invested considerable capital in the “Pebble-bed Modular Reactor” 
(PBMR) project. This is intended to address future power needs, but is not far enough ad-
vanced to present any immediate solution. It is best thought of as a miniaturised nuclear 
power plant that can be customised for localised use. Government is in the process of 
commissioning a test plant, following which full commercialisation could proceed, and 
has lined up a number of foreign investors to assist in capitalising the project. Altogether it 
is envisaged that 20-30 such plants could be commissioned.23 Unsurprisingly, the South 
African government also supports inclusion of nuclear energy in carbon-emissions reduc-
tion negotiations.24 
South Africa is caught between the urgent need for more electricity and the undesirability 
of building more coal-fired stations with their high carbon emissions to resolve future 
generation shortages. While various alternative energy sources are being explored,25 the 
only viable long-term solution with the capacity to produce sufficient electricity seems to 
lie in the use of nuclear generating plants as yet not built. As a producer of uranium, South 
Africa cannot and has not excluded the option of nuclear generation as a source of its 
power needs. 
According to the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (2004, 9)) renewable 
energy sources acount for approximately 9 percent of total national energy consumption. 
The same report states that South Africa is on of the world’s top 15 most energy-intensive 
economies. Recent moves to increase this share include the recent establishment by a 
German company, Johanna Solar Technology, of a joint venture with the state-owned 
Central Energy Fund (CEF) to commercially produce solar panels for the South African 
market. The CEF also recently established two agencies, The National Energy Efficiency 
                                                 
23 See Davie (2005). 
24 See Hofstatter (2005b). 
25 See Olivier (2006). 
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Agency and the South African National Energy Research Institute as wholly owned divi-
sions with mandates to promote energy efficiency and undertake research and technology 
development to fully utilise South Africa’s energy resources respectively. Hence efforts 
are being made, but they are fledgling at this stage. 
Concerning natural gas South Africa is not endowed with its own resources, therefore 
government has concentrated on tapping neighbouring Mozambique’s vast fields resulting 
in the construction of a gas pipeline from Mozambique’s Pande gas field to Secunda in 
South Africa, with feeder pipes to coastal locations under consideration. There is an exist-
ing offshore facility in Mossel Bay; plans are also afoot to construct a dedicated liquid to 
gas conversion facility in the port of Coega in the Eastern Cape based on imported Liquid 
Natural Gas (LNG); and substantial offshore exploration is taking place off the west coast. 
However, with little in the way of further gas supplies available regionally it is likely that 
the emphasis on nuclear power will increase over time.26 
It is clear from the aforegoing that South Africa has much to bargain for in global climate 
change negotiations. At the recently concluded Montreal conference reviewing implemen-
tation of the Kyoto protocol South Africa reportedly aligned with big developing countries 
like China and Brazil to resist carbon reduction commitments being assigned to them 
whilst pressing for a financing framework to assist developing countries to adapt to cli-
mate change. This is premised on the moral stance that developed countries are the major 
source of carbon emissions affecting the entire planet and therefore should make the major 
adjustments to fix the problem whilst assisting developing countries to prevent compara-
ble problems arising in the future. In line with this South Africa, together with major de-
veloping country polluters such as India, China, and Brazil, resisted agreeing to reductions 
commitments now but agreed to discuss post 2012 commitments.27 
2.4 Domestic Political Institutions 
The post-apartheid constitutions of South Africa, 1994 and 1996, introduced the concept 
of proportional representation to prevent the distortions that existed even among the white 
electorates under the pre-1994 constitution. The unforeseen consequence has been that 
Members of Parliament at national and provincial level and those city councillors elected 
by proportional representation without constituencies have proved to be loyal rather to the 
leadership of the party that placed their names in their party list, than to the electors who 
voted for the party, not the representative, of their choice. They are therefore not answer-
able to the voters to assure their re-election, but to the party that will again include their 
name on the party list. This occurs even though the party may assign them responsibility 
for a particular area or pseudo-constituency. The situation has been aggravated by the in-
troduction of a law permitting “floor-crossing” in certain circumstances. This permits 
Members elected on the list of one party to cross to another party during predetermined 
“window periods”, without having to resign or lose their parliamentary seats. Hence de-
mocratic accountability is a real problem throughout the body politic, and to a significant 
extent explains the delivery problems at local and provincial level outlined above. 
                                                 
26 See Planting (2005). 
27 See Macleod (2005) and Hofstatter (2005b). 
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The report of a commission investigating the electoral system, which proposed addressing 
the problem by introducing multi-member constituencies combined with proportional rep-
resentation, has been shelved by the government. 
The Constitution also provides for a number of institutions answerable to Parliament ra-
ther than the executive. These include the Auditor-General, Public Protector (ombuds-
men), Human Rights Commission, and Gender Commission. These institutions have been 
successful to varying degrees, depending on the willingness of the head to be unpopular 
with the ruling party and to follow an independent line. The most successful has been the 
Auditor-General, but other institutions, such as the Public Protector seemed to have been 
subjected to strong political pressure over the involvement of individuals close to the party 
in an oil scandal involving Iraq. The Independent Investigation Unit (against corruption in 
government) was emasculated when it wished to become involved in assessing the legality 
of the processes followed by government in the controversial international arms purchas-
ing deal. This reflects the Executive’s tight control over the institutional fabric of the state. 
South Africa has been likened to China and to Mexico in earlier times, as destined for the 
foreseeable future to be dominated by a single party. In South Africa this has been ob-
served to go in conjunction with a centralisation of power in the Presidency, impatience 
with criticism, and remoteness from the grassroots. There has, however, been no challenge 
to the principles of the Constitution or to the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction and rul-
ings. However, delays in implementing such rulings may indeed have occurred, notably 
with regard to rulings against the Department of Health in respect of its HIV/AIDS policy. 
This makes the watchdog role of organisations and institutions not dependent on the pa-
tronage of the executive more acute. The vibrant nature of investigative journalism and 
debate in the print and electronic media, and the role of civil society, are therefore critical 
as a monitor of and restraint on government action (see below). Continued international 
interest and focus on the progress being made by South Africa’s young democracy are also 
critical factors limiting potential government excesses. 
Depending on the outcome of the leadership transition in 2007 and 2009, these factors 
could be critical if the new leadership is less punctilious in observing the letter and spirit 
of the Constitution. Only time will tell. 
3 South Africa and Global Governance 
3.1 South Africa’s Evolving Foreign Policy 
South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994 has consisted of a number ofmain themes. In the 
two presidencies some have received more emphasis than others. They are: 
• The primacy of African issues, including the African Diaspora.28 
• South-South Co-operation.29 
                                                 
28 See Sidiropoulos (2004). Several contributions deal with this topic. 
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• Positive dialogue with the Industrialised North, in particular the G7/G8 on develop-
ment, poverty alleviation and other issues of importance to the South. 
• Emphasis on Multilateralism and Global Governance.30 
• The development of bilateral relations with all countries, but especially with those 
considered important for economic, technological, political or sentimental reasons.31 
South Africa emerged from international isolation in 1994 and immediately plunged ac-
tively into the international debate on issues of global governance. The reasons were mani-
fold.  First, becoming actively involved in the global debate as a good global citizen was a 
way of distancing the new democratic and internationally acceptable South Africa from 
the old pariah state that had been excluded from most international forums. Second, the 
post-1994 period was inspired by a new idealism based on a belief that commitment to the 
promotion of human rights, democracy, justice and international law in the conduct of in-
ternational relations, international peace and conflict resolution and the interests of Africa 
should be cornerstones of South African foreign policy. Participation in the debate on 
global issues was linked to this desire to make the world a better place. (“A better life for 
all” is an ANC slogan.) 
As an emerging middle power, South Africa would be able to make the greatest interna-
tional impact and contribution through participation in the work of developing global gov-
ernance through the work of multilateral forums and organisations – a position it shares 
with Brazil and other Latin American states. 
Unlike most other African countries, South Africa had the capability to participate effec-
tively in the global debate. This capability consisted of well-educated ANC exiles, who 
also had international experience in the work of organs such as the UN General Assembly; 
and serving diplomats from the ancien regime who relished the opportunity to participate 
in debates from which they had previously been excluded. South Africa’s critical role in 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference in April 1995, 
driven by long-serving diplomats, with the endorsement of then Deputy President Mbeki, 
is a prime example. 
Post-1994 South African foreign policy and its implementation may be divided into two 
phases. None are mutually exclusive, but within each there was a discernible change of 
emphasis. The first phase coincided with the Mandela Presidency and was globally orien-
tated on the cornerstones mentioned above. South Africa joined or rejoined many interna-
tional organisations. The second phase, coinciding with the commencement of the Mbeki 
Presidency, while maintaining its global good citizenship, placed more emphasis on the 
interests of Africa and its development, peacekeeping initiatives on the continent and the 
reform of African institutions. 
In the Mandela period an early decision of the new government was to have South Af-
rica’s classification as a developed country in international organisations changed to that 
                                                                                                                                                   
29 See Wheeler (2004a). 
30 See Wheeler (2004b). 
31 Ngubentombi (2004). 
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of a developing country. Once South Africa was permitted in June 1994 to resume its seat 
in the UN General Assembly, it began to play an active role in debates, as well as to par-
ticipate in the work of the G77, taking its turn as chair of the group. Almost from the be-
ginning of the democratically elected government, South Africa sought to play an active 
role in major UN conferences and summits, such as the UN Conference on Population and 
Development, 1994, the Beijing Women’s Conference, and the Copenhagen conference on 
social development. This involvement continued into the second phase when South Africa 
was active at the Monterrey conference on finance for development and subsequently 
hosted the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. 
Several major international events were hosted by South Africa, including United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) IX in 1995, The Information Society 
also in 1995, World AIDS summit, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
(CHOGM) and the 1998 summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). South Africa 
joined the NAM at an early stage after the transition (at the movement’s Cairo Ministerial 
meeting in 1994). It assumed the chair of the movement at the XII Summit in Durban, 
South Africa, in August 1998 and handed the leadership to Malaysia in 2003. During its 
term of office it took steps to make the movement more relevant to the post-Cold War 
world (“Non-Aligned with What?”). 
South Africa also rejoined the Commonwealth, various Specialised UN Agencies and or-
ganisations such as Interpol. On the other hand, it was selective in the organisations and 
groups it joined. It rejected overtures from the United Nations Industrial Development Or-
ganisation (UNIDO) to join and did not take up an invitation to join the G15, a group of 
developing nations, on the basis that the latter was no more than a talk shop and had 
achieved nothing. 
South Africa became a member of the Conference on Disarmament, brokering a deal by 
which the membership was considerably enlarged. It was instrumental in the finalisation 
of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which seeks to make Africa a nuclear weapons-free zone, and 
it supported the Central Asian states in their initiative in 1997 to create a Central Asia nu-
clear weapons free zone.32 In the negotiations leading to the creation of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), South Africa played an active part. Judges and staff were provided 
for the Great Lakes War Crimes Tribunal based in Arusha, for the Former Yugoslav War 
Crimes Tribunal in The Hague and later to the ICC itself. A highly regarded South African 
academic lawyer was elected to the International Law Commission with government sup-
port. 
From the beginning therefore South Africa sought to play a constructive role in all issues 
of global governance. In many respects it played a bridging role between the policy posi-
tions of the industrialised North and those of the developing South. This was not without 
difficulty or controversy. 
Among countries of the South, especially in Africa, there were signs that South Africa was 
regarded as too Western, both in life-style and in its support of issues considered to be the 
agenda of the North such as the observance of human rights and promotion of good gov-
ernance, as well as on the position it took on the extension of the alternatively Nuclear 
                                                 
32 See Markram (2004). 
Peter Draper / Tom Wheeler / Phil Alves 
20  German Development Institute 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The latter was in conflict with the non-aligned position as 
advocated by Indonesia. South Africa also disagreed and continues to disagree fundamen-
tally with another NAM leader and close ally, India, on the question of the possession of 
nuclear weapons. There were also concerns in some African quarters that South Africa had 
arrived late on the scene and should, in the African tradition, be more deferential to the 
views of the elder statesmen of the continent. Thus when President Mandela proposed the 
exclusion of Nigeria from the (British) Commonwealth after the government of Sani 
Abacha executed Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995, he was humiliated by other African countries 
who did not appreciate his breaking ranks with them. 
The South African government tended from the outset, therefore, to be very cautious about 
being seen as a “bully boy” or a “big brother” on the continent. This gave rise to the “Af-
rica Phase” in our foreign policy. Since the Nigeria incident, and especially since the as-
cent of President Thabo Mbeki to the position of head of state, the emphasis has shifted, 
outwardly at least, towards a greater emphasis on African issues and a closer alignment 
with other African countries and leaders. 
The controversial and, in South Africa, divisive issue of Zimbabwe is illustrative of this 
approach. While it has become more generally recognised that President Robert Mugabe 
of Zimbabwe is not susceptible to international pressure, the perception that South Africa 
is doing nothing about the issue under the cloak of “quiet diplomacy” seems to distance 
the country from much international thinking, but not from African thinking. Nor, for that 
matter, from South African black populist sentiments. 
Because of its overwhelming economic strength and level of development relative to other 
African states, even if not by wider world standards, South Africa cannot avoid playing 
the role of regional hegemon. As stated, it attempts to act with caution and tact in its rela-
tions with other countries on the continent. They on the other hand expect South Africa to 
play a pro-active and high profile role on behalf of the continent, while remaining suspi-
cious and resentful to varying extents. The comment, such as that by Nigeria some years 
ago, that South Africa is ‘a white country run by blacks’ was at once deeply hurtful and 
indicative of jealousy and the competitive nature of the relationship, especially from the 
Nigerian side. 
Likewise Egypt, which sees itself in a leadership role in Africa as well as the Middle East, 
displays an attitude to South Africa bordering on paranoia and closely follows South Af-
rica’s every international move, to the lowest level. The fact that South Africa was able in 
1995 to unseat Egypt from the “permanent” seat in the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) for the country most advanced in Africa in the field of nuclear issues, 
contributed to this attitude. Egypt had occupied the seat from 1977 when South Africa was 
excluded from the Board of Governors because of its domestic policies. 
The Mbeki presidency has been characterised by the creation of the African Union (AU), 
the reform of SADC, the launch of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD), and involvement of the President, the then Deputy President and several Cabi-
net Ministers in attempts to resolve conflicts and crises in Africa – the Great Lakes, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan and Zimbabwe being the 
most prominent. 
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The approach of South Africa has generally been to promote the model of inclusiveness of 
all conflicting or rival parties in the process that was the basis of success of South Africa’s 
progress to democracy. This could be characterised as a “soft power” approach to foreign 
policy whereas the instruments of a “hard power” approach are deliberately not stressed. 
While apparently successful in Burundi, Mbeki’s role in Cote d’Ivoire has been criticised, 
not only by President Chirac, but also by African academics. The view of the latter is that 
the South African model is not appropriate in Cote d’Ivoire, because it overlooks the large 
immigrant populations from neighbouring countries like Burkina Faso who have family, 
tribal, and religious relationships with Ivoreans in the north of the country that cannot be 
treated as irrelevant to the peace process. South African troops, police and demining spe-
cialists and technology have been made available for peacekeeping as well as for VIP pro-
tection and demining activities in Burundi, DRC, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Sudan, and Mozam-
bique, but also in the Former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan.33 
The outcome of the current political battle for succession in the leadership of the ANC 
(2007) and the Presidency in 2009 brings a degree of uncertainty into the foreign policy 
and foreign economic policy agendas that may be followed in future. While policies in the 
international sphere are likely to continue unchanged under their own momentum, the 
President may have less time to devote to international affairs while he attempts to deal 
with domestic party issues and grassroots discontent about poor service delivery by ANC 
office-bearers, especially at local government level. Symptomatic of this domestic preoc-
cupation was his abrupt cancellation, with little account of diplomatic niceties, of the 
Summit on Progressive Governance in October 2005, to which he had invited progressive 
international leaders such as the Prime Minister of Spain, President Lagos of Chile, Presi-
dent Lula da Silva of Brazil and about a dozen others. Party concerns had to take prece-
dence over international relations, even at the cost of offending these leaders and damag-
ing his personal relationships with them. The rescheduled Progressive Governance Sum-
mit was held near Pretoria in February 2206 and was considered a success.34 
For several reasons, mentioned below, South Africans tend to have a perhaps unusual fo-
cus on international affairs. Many members of the current ruling elite, including Mbeki 
and Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma, lived for extended periods in exile in many coun-
tries, often as representatives of the liberation movements. They were therefore politically 
aware and active. Their backgrounds led them to retain an interest in the affairs of other 
countries and the global community. 
Furthermore, South Africa has been in the international spotlight for more than 50 years. 
Its leaders and its military were role-players in the two World Wars and the Korean War. 
Also in the events following those wars, such as in implementing the League of Nations 
Mandate over South West Africa (now Namibia); the various peace treaties (South Africa 
is a guarantor of the borders of Turkey, as a party to the Treaty of Lausanne, 1925); estab-
lishment of the United Nations in San Francisco; and intensifying criticism and condem-
nation of its domestic policies from 1945 up until the transition to 1994.  To deflect atten-
tion from domestic issues, the state-controlled media especially, and (because of the pro-
                                                 
33 South Africa’s demining technology has been widely recognised as providing the first innovation since 
the Second World War. 
34 Kajee / Ngobese-Hammond (2006). 
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hibition on reporting the activities of proscribed political movements) also the private me-
dia tended to give attention to international rather than local news. 
As a country which was and continues to be a receiver of immigrants, previously Europe-
ans, now Africans and Asians, and also a country of emigration, many South Africans of 
all races have family members in many other countries. They travel widely on family vis-
its and are therefore interested in the affairs of the country where their children and family 
members live or have settled. Satellite television and the Internet provide those that can 
afford to the opportunity to remain informed of issues beyond the parochial. The turbulent 
environment in the region, and the fact that members of all communities have been in-
volved, on different sides, in armed hostilities in neighbouring countries further fuel socie-
tal interest in foreign affairs. 
South Africa has a lively and relatively sophisticated Non Governmental Organization 
(NGO) community, many doing research on international issues and making their research 
results available to a wider audience through the public media and through conferences 
and publications. Many of the critical issues in the region have a resonance in South Af-
rica: land redistribution in Zimbabwe; corruption; expansion of South African business 
interests into Africa. The influx of economic migrants from all over Africa has given rise 
to the problem of xenophobia in certain sectors of society who feel that their job prospects 
are threatened. These issues also give rise to heated debates in the newspapers and on talk 
radio. There is no internal consensus on the critical regional issues, such as Zimbabwe. 
Opinions among the public, rather than informed opinion, tend to be divided on racial 
lines. 
For its size and relative international importance, South Africa therefore has a surprisingly 
well-informed and internationally engaged population. This is reflected in the frequent ob-
servation that “South Africa punches above its weight” in international affairs. 
While the present government emerged from, and relied on the support of, non-
governmental organisations to raise the level of awareness and debate on the apartheid is-
sue and the continued imprisonment of Nelson Mandela and his comrades, a new sensitiv-
ity and suspicion of the role of NGOs in South Africa has recently emerged in the pro-
nouncements of the President. Local NGOs have been accused of serving the agendas of 
their foreign funders, rather than being independent in their advocacy and research. The 
rhetoric in some respects is reminiscent of the concerns expressed by the apartheid gov-
ernment when NGOs mounted sustained attacks on its policies. The pre-1994 government 
introduced legislation to curb foreign funding of NGOs, but there has been no sign to date 
of similar intentions by the current government. 
The President’s comments have been met with a critical response from NGOs, who have 
pointed out these similarities and denied that the outcome of their work is prescribed by 
funders. A lively public debate on a range of issues and tolerance of dissent has continued 
unhindered. 
The President’s recent outspoken comments were inspired by criticism of the South Afri-
can government’s approach to preparation for the review of South Africa’s performance 
by the AU’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM was a brainchild of 
Mbeki and of those who developed the concept of the NEPAD. It is akin to the Organiza-
tion for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) review mechanism and is intended 
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to assess the quality of governance and delivery. South African NGOs recently came to 
the conclusion that the South African government planned to control the assessment proc-
ess, sideline the input of non-state actors, and draft the report within two months, based on 
the government’s own report card to the electorate, produced in 2004 to celebrate ten 
years of democracy in South Africa. NGOs characterised this as a whitewash at a time 
when grassroots discontent with government delivery was manifesting itself and, more 
importantly, a bad example for less democratic and more corrupt African governments to 
use as a precedent. The government nevertheless, grudgingly, responded to their criticism 
by involving more NGO representatives in the process and extending the time allowed for 
public consultation.35 Parliament, which has become more compliant to the will of the ex-
ecutive, has also responded to its apparent exclusion from the process by setting up its 
own consultation process, separate from the executive process. To its credit, and in a re-
versal of its earlier attitude to the role of research institutions, on 16 February 2006 the 
government commissioned several such institutions to compile the reports on comments 
received from all sources concerning various aspects of governance. These will be submit-
ted to the APRM secretariat as the South African report. 
Issues on which NGOs have had an important impact on government policy are the land-
mine issue (leading to the Mine Ban Convention); conflict diamonds (leading to the Kim-
berley Process); HIV/AIDS policy; environmental issues such as conservation, water and 
air pollution and the culling of elephants; and nuclear energy. Wide media coverage of 
their views and campaigns ensures public awareness. International NGOs, such as Trans-
parency International, and its local branch, operate without hindrance. No attempts to deny 
them entry into South Africa have become known. Because opposition parties have not 
attracted major voter support and because criticism in Parliament has been to an extent 
sidelined, the media and civil society act as a watchdog and raise public awareness of is-
sues. 
Such dissent among the so-called Alliance Partners of the ANC, namely the COSATU and 
the South African Communist Party, and youth and women’s wings of the ANC, has, 
however, not been well-received by the governing party, and various attempts to discipline 
outspoken critics and bring them into line, have been taking place. COSATU’s support of 
their brother unionists in Zimbabwe, and their attempts to visit that country to observe 
conditions for themselves, were sharply criticised by the government. 
These fractures in the unity of the Alliance became of more importance after the dismissal 
of former Deputy President Zuma following a court case in which the judge found that 
there was a generally corrupt relationship between him and the accused. There was for a 
while a build-up of support for Zuma within grassroots supporters of the Alliance. It was 
as much a reaction to Mbeki’s centralising and distant style of government, as it was true 
support for Zuma. Yet these difficulties have so far not translated into punishment at the 
polls. In the last local government elections held on 1 March 2006 the ANC retained its 
overwhelming electoral dominance, garnering approximately 70 percent of the national 
vote. This reinforced the point that the true struggle for political power within South Af-
rica is within the ruling party which seems set to retain its electoral dominance into the 
foreseeable future. 
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3.2 Approaches to Global Governance 
South Africa seeks to play an active to very active role in almost all questions and proc-
esses of global governance. In the next section we deal specifically with international trade 
and the WTO. Here we focus on the UN and aspects of security policy. 
The position taken on UN reform and in particular the reform of the Security Council has 
tended to be low-key. South Africa did not announce its candidacy for a “permanent” 
Council seat until its potential rivals, Nigeria and later Egypt, did so. Until that juncture, 
South Africa consistently stated that it would support the African position – whatever that 
might be. South Africa participated in negotiations with the G4, including Germany and 
Brazil, to develop a common position on the allocation of new Council seats. The moder-
ate proposal was put to a summit in Addis Ababa and was rejected by leaders of “funda-
mentalist” states who made a “principled” but futile stand in favour of the right of veto for 
any new Africa permanent members. Representatives of these states have been mandated 
to promote their position with other UN members, if nothing else as an exercise in bring-
ing some more realism to the debate in Africa. 
It is perhaps instructive to note that South Africa has never, in the 60 year history of the 
UN or the eleven years of its democracy, been elected to the UN Security Council. In spite 
of its bid for a non-permanent seat in 2003, the Africa Group decided to support Namibia. 
The lack of support of South Africa’s candidacy to date is probably further evidence of the 
animosity and suspicion that exists among many African states for South Africa as a new-
comer and a perceived hegemon. This situation may change from 2006. After some initial 
hesitancy, South Africa, in the person of its Permanent Representative to the UN in New 
York, Dumesani Kumalo, is co-chairing the working group on the proposed UN Council 
on Human Rights. 
South Africa’s inclination is to participate in the whole gamut of global governance issues, 
whether in the UN, its Specialised Agencies, or in other regional or free-standing interna-
tional organisations or forums. Typical examples are the Antarctic Treaty and its Consul-
tative Meetings and the International Whaling Commission. Thus the new democratic 
government might have decided in 1994 to scale back South Africa’s expensive research 
activities in Antarctica, but it decided instead to remain actively involved. This is in line 
with its positive stance towards global environmental issues. The decision went against the 
calls by many scientists and officials to spend available resources on more practical and 
less expensive scientific research projects. Questions of prestige and good global citizen-
ship no doubt also played a role in the decision. 
While South Africa has sought to play a constructive role in all areas of global govern-
ance, it has taken a less than positive and inclusive stance when it subjects its position to 
the lowest common denominator of the “African consensus”. Examples are supporting 
such paragons of human rights rectitude as Libya and Sudan for membership of the UN 
Human Rights Commission as representatives of the African Group and supporting the No 
Action motion on Zimbabwe in the Commission. 
South Africa’s policies and positions in specialist organisations, such as the International 
Labour Organisation, the World Trade Organisation, and other Specialised Agencies tend 
to be handled by the technical Departments of State, rather than the Department of Foreign 
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Affairs, but nevertheless the political line pursued in these bodies is in general agreement 
with the approach of responsible global citizenship. 
One of the rare instances where South Africa appears from time to time to be at odds with 
the UN system is in regard to HIV/AIDS. This is a reflection of the ”denialist” views of 
President Mbeki, expressed in many of the statements and actions of his Health Minister, 
Manto Tshabala-Msimang. This is in spite of plans to roll out anti-retroviral treatment 
programmes and other measures to try to stem the spread of AIDS. Like the attitude to the 
issue of Zimbabwe, it is perceived as an aberration and a weak point in the policies of the 
Mbeki government. 
As an emerging middle power, South Africa emphasizes the importance of a rules-based 
international system and its actions in international forums are aimed to advance the 
global system on this basis. In situations like the invasion of Iraq, South Africa has consis-
tently supported the position that the UN Security Council should be the only organ al-
lowed to impose coercive measures. The tendency of the current US administration to re-
nege on earlier commitments to the international community, or to abrogate treaties or fail 
to ratify them, is a matter of concern and irritation to South Africa, at the political, official 
and individual level. This is reflected in the public media and in conversation. 
While South Africa regards the EU as an important, indeed vital, trading partner, there is 
concern that development funding will be diverted to the new members in the East and 
away from the countries of Africa. This concern is exacerbated by the generally inflexible 
attitude of the EU and its member countries on question of market access for agricultural 
products and the effect of domestic subsidies on efforts to export competing products to 
the EU. The Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) between South 
Africa and the EU is regarded as an important pillar of the relationship (see below) and 
provides the structures through which disagreements can be handled. On the other hand, 
the inability of EU member countries to agree on common foreign and defence policies 
has left South African decision-makers with the view that in these areas bilateral relation-
ships with individual countries are more effective. 
South Africa remerged into the international community with no baggage of earlier fixed 
policy positions. It was therefore able to bring a refreshingly undogmatic approach to the 
debate on global issues. This has sometimes been to the frustration of other parties, 
whether in the developing world or the industrialised north. Several examples have been 
provided. Where the policies of the pre-1994 government were considered sound, they 
were accepted and reinforced. The best example is the decision of the De Klerk admini-
stration to terminate the nuclear weapons programme, open its facilities to international 
inspection by the IAEA, and join the Nuclear NPT. The first formal foreign policy deci-
sion of the Mandela government was to adopt a comprehensive policy on non-
proliferation, disarmament and arms control on 31 August 1994. That policy stands. 
Various references are made in this document to the active role played by South Africa in 
international efforts to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.36 As a 
country that developed and possessed weapons of mass destruction before 1994, South 
Africa considers that it has an important international duty to work to prevent their prolif-
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eration. Having voluntarily terminated these programmes and permitted international veri-
fication of their termination, South Africa has the moral high ground in working for this 
objective in multilateral forums, and has done so actively. 
The South African government has taken an unequivocal stance against terrorism. This 
followed a terrorist attack on the Planet Hollywood restaurant in the Waterfront tourist 
district of Cape Town in 1998 and the events of 9/11. It has linked the need for counter-
terrorist actions to the need for a worldwide commitment to eradicate poverty. It has fur-
ther recognised that combating terrorism should also not be at the expense of civil liberties 
and human rights. 
In implementing the policy, actions have been taken to restrict the ability of terrorist or-
ganisations to operate from South Africa. One of the perpetrators of the first World Trade 
Centre bombing was handed over to the US authorities, and through intelligence sharing a 
person suspected of involvement in the London Underground terrorist attacks was appre-
hended in Zambia after leaving South Africa. Legislation has been implemented to moni-
tor money laundering through the Financial Intelligence Centre Act which places a re-
sponsibility on financial institutions to “know their customers” and to report transactions 
above prescribed levels, or other transactions of a suspicious nature, to the Financial Intel-
ligence Centre. The government has given notice that it plans to tighten this legislation. 
Drug trafficking, both domestically and using South Africa as a transit route, is of serious 
concern to South Africa and receives active attention from the responsible agencies of the 
state. With its transport links to all regions of the world, good telecommunications links, a 
sophisticated banking system, sometimes less than efficient law enforcement and customs 
control, a large immigrant population (partly illegal), large income disparities and high un-
employment, South Africa has become a target and route of preference for drug traffick-
ers. The problem has been approached in a multifaceted way. In addition to internal law 
enforcement, South Africa has been an active participant in the work of the UN Commis-
sion on Narcotic Drugs since 1994, and is a party to various international conventions on 
the control of drug trafficking. In addition to working with Interpol, it has developed bilat-
eral police and anti-drug agreements and arrangements with a number of countries, such as 
Colombia. Such arrangements have led to the successful identification and apprehension 
of drug traffickers transiting airports in source regions and on arrival in South Africa. 
As an arms manufacturer, South Africa strictly controls the export of all armaments. Con-
ventional arms are subject to the jurisdiction of the National Conventional Arms Control 
Committee (NCACC). All export permit applications are scrutinised in terms of fixed cri-
teria. Control of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons technology, including dual use 
items, are within the jurisdiction of the Non-Proliferation Council, functioning within the 
Department of Trade and Industry. 
South Africa was actively involved in the work to ban anti-personnel landmines, leading 
to the Mine Ban Treaty. It also plays an active role in attempts to control the proliferation 
of small arms, especially in Africa, and in work concerning implementation of the Chemi-
cal and Biological Weapons treaties. As small arms are a significant threat to peace in Af-
rica, South Africa has taken the initiative in a variety of ways to control proliferation in 
Africa. This has included lobbying suppliers, particularly in the former Eastern bloc, to 
cease exports of surplus stocks to Africa, cross-border co-operation with neighbouring 
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states to trace hidden illegal arms caches, and the destruction rather than recycling of sur-
plus stocks or illegal caches of small arms. At international forums South Africa has taken 
an active role in attempting to deal with the problem and has expressed frustration at the 
US undermining multilateral efforts to control the proliferation of small arms. 
The Charter of the AU makes provision for a Peace and Security Council. Its efficacy and 
its relationship to the UN Security Council remain to be developed and tested. The conflict 
in Dafur, Sudan, represents such a test. 
The dilemma of respect for serving heads of state remains unresolved. There is a prefer-
ence for negotiated solutions, and the South African government has devoted much time 
and energy to its attempts to achieve negotiated settlements to disputes in countries such 
as the DRC and Burundi, moving away from its earlier hosting of high-profile interna-
tional conclaves.  
As explained above, democratization and human rights were initially cornerstones of the 
post-1994 foreign policy. They remain tenets of the NEPAD programme. But dilemmas 
have emerged that have resulted in decisions based on realpolitik considerations and in 
order to maintain African solidarity, South Africa has supported African positions which 
are in conflict with the announced cornerstones of its foreign policy. A typical example is 
the change in South Africa’s position on Iran in the UN General Assembly in 1996. Prior 
to the visit of then President Rafsanjani to South Africa and a private meeting with Presi-
dent Mandela, South Africa voted against Iran on its human rights policies. Subsequently 
South Africa abstained. The basis of this decision may have been financial support for the 
ANC during the time, even after the revolution, when Iran was supplying petroleum prod-
ucts to apartheid South Africa. Similarly, and like most other countries, nothing has been 
done to address human rights issues in China in order not to disturb a burgeoning trade 
relationship. And Cuba has a particular place in South Africa’s contemporary political my-
thology. Cuban troops faced South African forces in Angola in the 1970s and 1980s. Cuba 
supported ANC cadres and continues to provide medical training and doctors for South 
Africa – although this programme is coming to an end. Therefore, although Cuba’s politi-
cal system is the diametric opposite of that enshrined in the South African constitutions of 
1994 and 1996, warm ties of sentiment continue to exist and there is no criticism of the 
Cuban political system or pressure to change it. 
President Mbeki attempted to have Zimbabwe restored to full membership of the Com-
monwealth, but was uncharacteristically humiliated by his peers from Africa and other 
countries of the developing world, who did not support his initiative at the Abuja CHOGM 
in 2004. 
3.3 Global Economic Governance: Trade 
Areas where the African and global agendas overlap have been the reform of the United 
Nations and the reform of voting rights in global financial institutions, such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, plus advancing the WTO’s Doha round 
of trade negotiations. At this stage little is known outside the Treasury regarding South 
Africa’s positions on reform of the international financial architecture and development 
finance. Consequently we concentrate here on trade diplomacy. 
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In the Uruguay Round South Africa committed to a major overhaul (simplification and 
liberalization) of its complex tariff regime, and signed up to the Single Undertaking. Spe-
cial and Differential Treatment (SDT) did not play a role during this period owing to the 
fact that the Apartheid government considered South Africa a developed country in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) context and more generally. Under-
girding South Africa’s commitments and participation in the Uruguay Round was the 
strong need to overcome the isolation of the 1980s and the need to promote economic 
competitiveness in a context of economic stagnation. 
International competitiveness and reintegration into the global economy became crucial 
pillars of the ANC government’s policy as it turned its back on more statist forms of eco-
nomic policy in the wake of the first rand crisis in 1996. This culminated in more rapid 
liberalization of tariffs than required in terms of South Africa’s GATT bindings.37 This is 
a source of considerable tension in the tripartite alliance, as COSATU argues that this 
rapid liberalization was a direct cause of today’s high levels of unemployment. 
Given that the Uruguay Round was complete when the ANC came to power in 1994, the 
trade liberalization trajectory turned to bilateral and regional tracks. Unilateral trade liber-
alization has not been seriously on the agenda since. Rather, adjustments to the Most Fa-
voured Nation (MFN) tariff regime have been left to the Doha Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations. South Africa’s most important objective in the Doha round is to solve the 
agricultural subsidies puzzle first, before moving onto other areas. Therefore the Brazil-
India led G20 alliance was a natural one, with South Africa straddling the two poles these 
countries represent (offensive in Brazil’s case, defensive in India’s). Largely at the instiga-
tion of South Africa’s commercial farmers South Africa is also a member of the Australia-
led Cairns group, with its market access focus. That is important, but hardly critical, to 
South Africa’s export trajectory, accounting for a small proportion (approximately 10 per-
cent) of the overall export basket, whilst agriculture constitutes a small proportion of 
GDP. The land reform process and associated class of emerging black farmers ensure a 
partly defensive posture currently and in the future. 
Of far greater importance is securing access to markets for South Africa’s intermediate 
manufacturing exports and liberalization of services sectors in African markets in particu-
lar. These interests are opposed to those of the G90 (a grouping representing the poorest 
developing countries)38 which favours continued preferential access to developed country 
markets with minimal or no reciprocation. SDT and the implementation agenda – priori-
ties for the G90 – have received differing levels of support, with the emphasis being on the 
former rather than the latter. 
Well-established South African service sectors, employing substantial numbers of skilled 
and unskilled workers, could face significant threats from foreign providers if negotiations 
– in all fora and at all levels – are not handled very carefully. The most obvious example 
in this instance is the Free Trade Area (FTA) with the United States, currently under nego-
tiation. On the negative side of the balance sheet social services liberalization will have to 
be carefully weighed owing to potential domestic opposition. On the positive side, further 
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protection, although counterveiling duties and safeguards have hardly been employed. 
38 In which the Africa group is a critical constituency. 
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openings in our services sector, notably in core infrastructure services,39 could go a long 
way towards introducing competition and efficiencies into quasi-monopoly sectors. If cor-
rectly managed this would have the major benefit of lowering cost structures, thereby 
promoting competitiveness across the board and supporting the six percent GDP growth 
objective. 
Regionally the picture is rather different. South Africa would do well to seek liberalization 
of service sectors in SADC markets, again in core infrastructure. Yet to date there has 
been no movement on services trade liberalization in any of the official SADC or Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) structures. This is clearly as important a policy priority 
as any defensive concerns vis-à-vis the US (or the WTO). 
South Africa’s relatively low activity levels in the WTO General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) negotiations and in bilateral trade negotiations – at least compared to 
much more developed policy positions on trade in goods – represent a key area in need of 
greater focus and effort. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has recognised this 
need and now seems to be building some capacity to service it. Furthermore, there is some 
movement within organized business to develop their capacity to engage on these issues 
that should be supported. 
South Africa supported efforts at the Cancun Ministerial to significantly delay or even 
cancel entirely negotiations on two of the four issues raised at the 1996 Singapore Minis-
terial.40 South Africa argued publicly that because the USA and the EU could not guaran-
tee meaningful reform in agriculture, developing countries should rightly oppose negotia-
tions on these issues.41 South Africa also argued that there was little evidence that indus-
trialised countries would be committed to ensuring that any agreements on the new issues 
that might be reached would be developmental in nature. 
The South African government is not opposed to the principle of greater transparency in 
government procurement. Transparency in the tender process does in fact receive a large 
amount of attention in the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (no. 12 of 
2004). Rather, there are concerns over what multilateral negotiations on this issue might 
mean for the government’s freedom to use its considerable spending power as it sees fit. 
The state, it is argued, should be allowed to discriminate on development grounds in the 
awarding of contracts to private enterprise. This is a cornerstone of government’s black 
economic empowerment policy – a policy with widespread public support. Given the ex-
tent of poverty and inequality in South Africa, apartheid’s legacy, and the large contribu-
tion government expenditure makes to GDP, these concerns are not likely to fade. 
Concerning investment South Africa sought to balance its substantial outward investment 
position with the need for developing country solidarity. Furthermore, the government has 
an existing network of bilateral investment treaties, rendering a multilateral approach of 
                                                 
39 Telecommunications, energy (although arguably this sector is well-managed), transport, and financial. 
40 The four are: trade facilitation; transparency in government procurement; trade and competition policy; 
trade and investment policy. Of these South Africa opposed government procurement and competition 
policy, adopted a neutral position on investment, and supported trade facilitation. 
41 ‘Agriculture for Singapore Issues’ was the informal ‘deal’ designed to reduce developing country resis-
tance to the latter. 
Peter Draper / Tom Wheeler / Phil Alves 
30  German Development Institute 
questionable benefit. However, given the uncertain political transition now under way in 
South Africa a key policy priority should be to reassure nervous investors, particularly in 
light of the continually unfolding catastrophe in Zimbabwe. And attracting foreign direct 
investment to South Africa remains a central economic policy goal. 
On the bilateral front, after the first democratic elections in 1994 relations with the EU 
were high on the agenda given the preponderance of EU markets in South Africa’s export 
basket. When the new government realized that the EU was not going to grant it full ac-
cess to Lomé preferences it opted instead to negotiate a comprehensive agreement cover-
ing trade, aid and political cooperation.42 After six years of difficult negotiations the final 
agreement covered “substantially all trade” and was asymmetrical in two respects: EU 
markets were opened first, and to approximately 95 percent of South African exports ver-
sus 86 percent in return.43 This experience, and the new government’s policy trajectory in 
support of developing countries, constituted a substantive shift from the previous govern-
ment’s general approach to trade negotiations. 
The process of negotiations44 turned out to be divisive, notably the EU’s decision not to 
include South Africa’s customs union partners in its negotiating mandate. Furthermore, 
many Group of African, Caribbian and Pacific states (ACP) were concerned about the 
precedent this agreement set for the future of their relations with the EU – correctly as it 
turns out given the unfolding Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) negotiations tak-
ing place under the Cotonou Convention. 
The second pillar of the regional/bilateral strategy was negotiations with the countries of 
the SADC to form an Free Trade Area (FTA). Approximately one-third of South Africa’s 
manufacturing exports goes to SADC countries, hence locking in market access was a key 
motivation. Once again, these negotiations proved divisive, given the presence in the re-
gion of the Community of Southern and Eastern African States (COMESA) and associated 
overlap in memberships. South Africa’s decision to opt for SADC over COMESA was 
widely resented by many countries in the region, which came to the view that the South 
African government simply wanted to work with a grouping it could dominate.45 This ex-
perience, coupled with the South African government’s subsequent support for launching 
the new round of multilateral negotiations at Doha – notwithstanding generalised resis-
tance in the Africa Group – and the estrangement of our Customs Union partners in the 
EU negotiations has bequeathed a legacy of mistrust of the South African government’s 
intentions in the region.46 
                                                 
42 Signed in October 1999, this was known as the TDCA. 
43 For details and analysis see Bertelsman-Scott / Mills / Sidiropoulos (2000). 
44 For a detailed analysis of the structures and institutions associated with the negotiations process see Bi-
lal / Laporte (2003). 
45 The DTI points out that there is more to this choice than meets the eye, notably the plethora of regional 
integration arrangements in Eastern and Southern Africa and the need to promote regional coherence. 
Critics retort that South Africa’s choice to join SADC and not COMESA compounded this problem. 
46 In research we have conducted into regional preparations for Economic Partnership Agreement negotia-
tions with the EU these sentiments were clearly in evidence. 
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South Africa’s trade strategy now has to take serious cognisance of our partners in the 
SACU,47 as the new SACU agreement came into force in July 2004. This agreement is of 
historic significance in that it commits South Africa to effectively ceding sovereignty over 
trade policy formulation and implementation to new inter-governmental institutions, 
which have yet to be established (see Figure 6). In essence, all decisions over tariffs and 
trade remedies will be taken at the SACU level by a Council of Ministers,48 advised in 
turn by a new SACU tariff body and a commission of senior officials. National institutions 
(in South Africa’s case the International Trade Administration Commission-ITAC) will 
merely provide recommendations to the supranational structures on the basis of investiga-
tions the former conduct. 
So SACU will potentially be fully involved in all current and future negotiations, as re-
quired by Article 31 of the new SACU Agreement. This is a clear break from historical 
practice whereby South Africa decided all tariff matters unilaterally. It has complicated 
decision-making with respect to trade negotiations given that internal consultations now 
have to take place and negotiations involve all countries (although in practice the South 
African Department of Trade and Industry takes the lead). Furthermore, section 8 of the 
                                                 
47 The BLNS. 
48 Historically Finance ministers constituted the Council given the dominance of revenue issues in SACU. 
Now both trade and finance ministers participate in the council and trade ministers schedule additional 
focused meetings on broader economic and trade issues. 
Figure 6: The New SACU 
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agreement outlines a range of policy areas on which the partners are required to coordinate 
policy. Interestingly, South Africa’s FTA negotiations with the US have brought home the 
need to coordinate internally prior to entering into demanding negotiations with the likes 
of the US. Notwithstanding these dynamics it remains to be seen to what extent our cus-
toms union partners (Botsuana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swasiland – the BLNS) will grasp the 
nettle and use this new framework to constrain South Africa’s freedom of action. And this 
does point to a need for the partners to integrate their planning processes more coherently 
over time. 
Partly owing to the increasing involvement of external powers in the region49 the South 
African government is interested in expanding SACU. Currently Mozambique is consider-
ing its options in this respect. An expanded SACU could absorb SADC, or even parts of 
COMESA, if it works well. However political differences within the region are likely to 
delay this agenda. Nonetheless it is an arena deserving closer attention. 
Meanwhile, trade negotiations in South Africa, as in many countries, have become in-
creasingly intertwined with foreign policy. In the multilateral system, for example, the 
foreign policy imperative revolves around how to mesh South Africa’s economic interests 
with the positions taken by the Africa group in the WTO given that resolving Africa’s 
problems is the central foreign policy terrain.50 And in keeping with global trends, a new 
wave of bilateralism has broken out. This is broadly guided by the DTI “Global Economic 
Strategy”, and is divided into three tracks: first the US, the European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA) and Mercosur; second India and China; third Singapore/Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN); Japan; South Korea; Nigeria and Kenya. Track one is currently 
underway with EFTA recently completed and Mercosur close to completion. But negotia-
tions with the US have run into serious difficulties. This reflects major differences be-
tween South Africa and the US concerning trade liberalization in general and the US’s 
“WTO-plus” approach to bilateral negotiations. To some extent it also reflects the South 
African government’s desire, in common with Brazil, to pursue strong alliances with key 
developing countries in order to balance US power. Track two has yet to commence, al-
though it is anticipated that negotiations will get underway next year, whilst track three is 
likely to be considerably delayed owing to DTI capacity constraints. 
4 South Africa and Germany: Convergences and Divergences51 
South Africa is historically, politically and in terms of economic development and senti-
ment, a country of the South. Nevertheless, it recognises that a sound relationship with the 
industrial countries of the North is critical if the problems of underdevelopment and pov-
erty in Africa are to be addressed effectively. Positive engagement with the industrialised 
countries is therefore a major element of South African foreign policy. This applies 
equally to relations with Germany. 
                                                 
49 The European Union is negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements with all of sub-Saharan Africa 
whilst the US is following suit with its own negotiations with SACU. 
50 See Draper / Khumalo (2005). 
51 In part based on interviews with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). 
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Similarities have been noted between effects of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise 
of apartheid, both of which were facilitated by the end of the Cold War, and between the 
problems that have to be dealt with in the aftermath. The principles and values enshrined 
in the South African Constitution run parallel to those of Germany. South Africa has learnt 
from the German experience and models on issues such as the role of the Constitutional 
Court (one of South Africa’s most respected institutions), federal elements in its Constitu-
tion, and the civilian control of the Armed Forces (the doctrine of Innere Fűhrung).52 
Germans made an important contribution to South Africa from the earliest days of the 
Dutch settlement in the 17th Century. Subsequent waves of German migration in the 19th 
and 20th century have left an indelible mark on South Africa and the region. In contempo-
rary South Africa their descendants and members of the German business community con-
tinue to make a vital contribution to the economy and economic development of South Af-
rica. The role in South Africa of German teachers and of institutions such as the Goethe 
Institute are much valued, as is the funding for independent research provided by the Kon-
rad Adenauer, the Friedrich Ebert, the Hans Seidel and other Foundations. 
There is much appreciation for the willingness of the organisers of the 2006 Soccer World 
Cup to share their experiences of the planning and execution of the event with the South 
African organisers of the 2010 competition. 
South Africa attaches great value to its sound relationship with Germany and to the fact 
that Germany’s only Bi-national Commission is with South Africa. The commission is 
regarded as a success. It functions as an annual political oversight and policy-formulation 
body for a series of focussed committees that are regarded as the basic anchors of relations 
between the two countries. The committees meet regularly during each year to deal with 
the substantive issues in those relations, within set time-frames. The committees are: De-
fence, Environment, Science and Technology, Economics and Trade, and Development 
Cooperation and Finance. The Economics committee is the most evolved and also deals 
with the most problematic issues, such as the implementation of Black Economic Empow-
erment (BEE), the effects of AIDS in the workplace, and the issues that have to be dealt 
with in the Doha round of WTO negotiations. South Africa is planning a series of road-
shows in Germany to deal with and explain its position on some of these issues in 2006. It 
would seem that the large companies are more able to deal with issues such as the BEE 
scoreboards that are envisaged to become effective, but creative solutions for small com-
panies, often owned by one person or family need to be found. 
While there may be some residual sensitivities about the fact that German companies did 
not disinvest during the 1970s and 1980s, the importance of their inward investment 
(Germany is South Africa’s third largest source of FDI) and of Germany as South Africa’s 
fourth trading partner, greatly outweigh these issues from a past era. South Africa has a 
positive trade balance with Germany, much of it based on motor components, such as the 
leather motor car seats made in South Africa for BMW. There are believed to be 450 
German companies operating in South Africa. German companies are critical in the auto-
motive sector, although there is now a substantial, and at times acrimonious, debate over 
the future of the Motor Industry Development Plan (MIDP). This scheme is credited with 
                                                 
52 Observations during a visit to Germany sponsored by the Hans Seidel Foundation and arranged by the 
Institute for Security Studies in 1992. 
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converting the industry’s position from import-substitution dependent to substantial export 
orientation. Critics charge that this has come at a cost in the form of inflated car prices – a 
liability in a country still suffering from the debilitating effects of apartheid spatial plan-
ning. This is a burning issue as the MIDP undergoes its periodic mid-term review, the out-
come of which could have major implications for German car companies in South Africa. 
On foreign policy issues such as the invasion of Iraq, Afghanistan, terrorism and the achie-
vement of the UN’s Millenium Development Goals, South Africa largely shares the same 
positions as Germany. It joined with the G4 and a number of African countries in develop-
ing a realistic proposal for UN Security Council reform – which regrettably was not sup-
ported by the following AU summit. The assumption of office of the new German Chan-
cellor, and the policies she follows, may in future influence the degree of similarity in the 
policies of the two countries. In the apparently unlikely event of the new Chancellor mov-
ing German foreign policy more towards the American disdain for, and undermining of, 
multilateralism, as propounded by neo-conservatives who strongly influence the policies if 
the Bush administration, a parting of the ways South Africa should be expected. 
As South Africa continues to follow responsible financial policies and seeks to create an 
environment friendly to foreign direct investment, no major difficulties seem imminent. 
Development Cooperation is sometimes a sensitive issue from the South African side, as 
most of the funding pledged by Germany is in fact spent in Germany on German goods 
and for the emoluments of German staff working on the projects. The management of de-
velopment assistance is handled by the National Treasury, which insists that funding 
pledged to South Africa is fully spent. If for instance ten experts are pledged and only 
eight are sent, the Treasury will insist that the resulting savings nevertheless be spent to 
advance the aims of the project. 
5 Risks, Scenarios, and Possible Avenues for German Development 
Assistance 
From the discussion in parts two and three, three major domestic risk sets are identified in 
5.1: macroeconomic; climate change; and political. Each set is decomposed into three ma-
jor internal risks. Based on these risk sets three long-term scenarios are identified in 5.2, 
which in turn are used to condition the discussion of possible avenues for German devel-
opment assistance in 5.3. 
5.1 Risks 
• Macroeconomic: 
There is a consensus amongst economists that South Africa’s economic growth path still 
remains closely linked to the fortunes of the global economy via commodity prices. So the 
performance of the international economy, especially the trajectory of commodity prices, 
is critical to our economic performance. Therefore any slowdown in major developed 
country markets, notably the US, EU, and Japan; plus a slowdown or even reversal of 
China’s economic growth and associated demand for commodities, would have serious 
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implications for South Africa’s economic growth trajectory. Should such a slowdown oc-
cur the possibility for a major exogenous shock to the South African economy via im-
ported financial instability would also arise. In this respect it is important to recall that 
since 1994 South Africa has suffered three currency shocks, each of which was associated 
with declining domestic economic growth and rising inflation. 
There is a wide range of conceivable threats; too many to list or contemplate here. The key 
question though is how well the South African economy would weather such storms and 
the impact this would have on the economic growth path and public finances. The primary 
risk is that economic growth does not measure up to expectations. This would have unde-
sirable economic consequences, and associated social problems would multiply. Similarly, 
the Keynesian kickstart strategy could be undermined through declining public revenues. 
Then there is the threat posed by accumulating HIV/AIDS deaths which threaten to over-
whelm the public health system and unravel public finances. 
The potential conclusion of the Doha round of trade negotiations, whilst most appropri-
ately conceived of as a set of opportunities both for cheaper imports and export markets, 
does constitute a risk in the sense that potentially painful domestic adjustments may be 
required. As things currently stand the round is inching towards an unambitious conclu-
sion at the end of 2006. 
The primary risk set for South Africa is in the area of industrial goods, where substantial 
revisions to applied tariffs may be required. At most risk are the clothing and textiles, and 
automotive sectors. Concerning the former, a wrenching adjustment process has been un-
derway for some years now associated primarily with the rise of efficient Asian exporters. 
This process accelerated in 2005 after the expiration of the quota regime constraining ex-
ports, and will accelerate further after extended restrictions on China’s exports lapse in 
2008. Concerning the latter, the tariff phase-down associated with the MIDP may have to 
be substantially revised, with associated impacts on investment plans – particularly of 
German original equipment manufacturers. Taken together there could be substantial im-
pacts – although it is not possible to say whether these would be on balance positive or 
negative – on output, exports and employment. 
• Climate change: 
The primary risks associated with climate change have been outlinedabove. These include 
growing water scarcity and associated agricultural production shortfalls, the latter poten-
tially aggravated by the land reform process if it is not well-managed. This connects to a 
broader regional scenario of growing food insecurity arising from a combination of AIDS 
impacts on populations; poor governance; and regional climate change. Some observers 
have characterised these trends as collectively constituting an “arc of crisis” conveyed by 
the riders of the apocalypse extending across the region. 
Two long-term threats are readily identifiable. First, South Africa’s commercial agricul-
tural production may be negatively effected, with associated impacts on employment and 
exports. Second, growing regional food insecurity may promote greater levels of immigra-
tion into South Africa, further pressuring our fiscus. Whilst recourse to GM technologies 
has the potential to ameliorate these risks, it comes with its own set of risks residing pri-
marily in the scientific and consumer domains. Concerning the former, whilst available 
science does not currently identify negative impacts associated with consumption of GM 
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crops and foods, there is still an element of uncertainty associated with the technologies. 
Concerning the latter it is not clear how global regulatory regimes will evolve, and how 
these may impact on regional regulatory structures. It may be that a combination of these 
factors curtails prospects for GM food production and export in the region thereby exacer-
bating food insecurity. 
• Political: 
The primary issue in the political sphere is the leadership succession battle underway in 
the ANC. This is connected to the broader economic debate and the future course of eco-
nomic policy. At issue is the Mbeki legacy, and whether his successor will continue down 
the path of (mostly) business friendly reforms. At the time of writing it seems the succes-
sion battle may be contained in the sense that it will not split the country and our institu-
tions. However, there remains a worrying possibility that this may occur, a circumstance 
that would seriously test our young democracy. 
Whilst the succession drama plays itself out it distracts attention from resolving pressing 
and growing delivery problems at local level. The key risk here is one of escalating urban 
unrest, associated with high levels of poverty and unemployment. This is potentially a po-
tent factor in the leadership succession process. These dynamics have obvious connections 
with the macroeconomic and climate change risks identified above, although the former is 
of more direct short-term relevance. 
5.2 Scenarios 
Three basic scenarios are proffered, based on the risks identified above. These are not in-
tended to be exhaustive, rather they are merely suggestive of broad possible futures. 
Clearly South Africa’s future is much more complex than the simple pictures suggested 
here, but they may nonetheless be useful for planning purposes. 
• “Malaysian manna” 
This is the optimistic scenario. Economic growth achieves its targets with no major exter-
nal shocks. This unlocks a virtuous cycle of state investment in growth-enhancing infra-
structure projects, in turn unlocking domestic private investment. Foreign investors are 
attracted to South Africa’s rapidly growing economy, and employment rises. The out-
comes of the Doha round and other trade negotiations are positive and encourage domestic 
production, productivity growth, and export expansion. Climate change proves not to be as 
serious as thought, and commercial agriculture booms on the back of growing productivity 
increases associated with GM technologies. Regional food insecurity is well-managed 
with South Africa playing an increasingly active role in regional governance and provision 
of food. South Africa assumes its logical place of driving regional growth and develop-
ment. The political transition is carefully managed, preserving the Mbeki legacy thereby 
boosting the confidence of the private sector to invest. Increasing state resources associ-
ated with a rapidly growing economy are reinvested in delivery and urban unrest declines 
alongside rising employment. South Africa becomes Africa’s first “lion economy”, emu-
lating Malaysia’s rapid transition from crisis conditions to newly industrializing economy. 
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• “Italian Imbroglio” 
This is the “muddle through” scenario. The political succession is fudged, resulting in a 
compromise candidate in no position to drive through necessary reforms. Democracy is 
preserved but governance increasingly resembles Italy, in the sense that the state becomes 
chaotic but still functions, whilst the economy bubbles along largely in spite of it. The in-
formalisation of the labour market continues whilst delivery problems remain endemic. 
Criminality rises and is entrenched. The economy continues to expand, punctuated by ex-
ternal shocks, but cannot attain the holy grail of 6 percent economic growth. The mindset 
in business and government remains defensive, and new possibilities opened up via trade 
negotiations are grudgingly implemented. Productivity remains low and business focused 
on the domestic market and defending their prerogatives. South Africa remains a reluctant 
regional hegemon, doing little to boost regional economic growth through opening its own 
markets. The commercial agriculture sector retains its vitality, but shrinks in size and pro-
ductivity as land reform gathers pace and is patchily managed. Regional food insecurity 
and governance deficits remain endemic and the region remains mired in its “arc of cri-
sis”. 
• “Zimbabwean Vortex” 
This is the “nightmare” scenario. The failed state to our north sucks us into its slow-
motion crisis. This scenario is driven by domestic political instability, feeding into all as-
pects of governance and dragging down the domestic economy. The political succession 
proves highly contentious, and a populist takes the helm of the ANC pandering to every 
whim in his broad-based constituency. Criminality and the state become inseparable. Land 
reform assumes Zimbabwean proportions and the economy melts down as domestic inves-
tors squirrel their money abroad and the institutional fabric unravels. Serious delivery 
problems and unemployment go unaddressed as political contestation takes centre stage. 
Democracy is replaced by authoritarianism and dissent is not tolerated. The regional “arc 
of crisis” extends into South Africa, and the world moves on in despair. 
5.3 Possible Avenues for German Development Assistance 
Of the three scenarios briefly sketched above, the “Zimbabwean Vortex” seems least 
likely as things currently stand. If such a scenario were to materialise there would be little 
prospect for bilateral development assistance beyond politically favourable projects. 
Whilst political calculations play a role in allocation of development assistance, in this 
scenario the risk of such processes becoming highly corrupted would escalate. The most 
logical avenue for such assistance would be civil society institutions, broadly defined. 
This would have a delivery component, designed to mitigate state failure, and a democ-
racy component targeted at bolstering informed debate over policy options and democratic 
space. Beyond this it is not profitable to speculate about possible avenues for development 
assistance. 
Under the “Italian Imbroglio” scenario development assistance would be best targeted at 
bolstering governance. In this scenario institutions continue to function, but are limited in 
their capacity to deliver to citizens. The best targets for development assistance would be 
delivery agencies, especially at provincial and local government levels. Human resource 
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development would also be important, both in the educational system but also basic train-
ing and entrepreneurship development. This would feed the “bubbling economy” which in 
turn would create sufficient economic opportunities to stave off a major social crisis. The 
criminal justice system would also be an important destination for development assistance 
in order to assist in containing social instability and associated criminality. 
Under the “Malaysian Manna” scenario skills shortages and infrastructure bottlenecks 
(both physical and human) would rapidly manifest themselves. Consequently development 
assistance would most profitably be targeted at human resource development, immigration 
agencies, and trade facilitation institutions. This would assist the growth process thereby 
helping to ensure the virtuous cycle continues with its positive impacts on domestic social 
problems. This approach would also be profitably complemented by assistance for deliv-
ery institutions, as outlined under the “Italian imbroglio” scenario. 
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